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Tax Credits for Child Care 
Increase Take-up and May 
Help More Mothers Work 
Gabrielle Pepin 
ARTICLE HIGHLIGHTS 
n The Child and Dependent 
Care Credit reduces child care 
costs for working families.
 
n About 20 percent of 
households with children 
younger than 13 years old 
qualify for benefits.
n A 20 percent increase in 
benefits increases paid child 
care use by about 10 percent.
n Increases in generosity also 
increase work participation 
among married mothers.
n CDCC benefits may help 
mothers remain in the labor 
force around childbirth.
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Child care in the United States is expensive. 
According to a 2018 Care.com survey of 1,300 
U.S. parents, 33 percent of families with kids 
spent at least 20 percent of their incomes on 
child care. Child care costs matter because high 
costs may push parents to leave the labor force 
or to place their children in low-quality child 
care arrangements. In light of this, many U.S. 
policymakers have advocated measures to reduce 
child care costs. 
Currently, the Child and Dependent Care 
Credit (CDCC), a tax credit based on income 
and child care expenditures, subsidizes child care 
costs for working families. Te federal CDCC is 
available to households with children younger 
than 13 years old in which all parents have positive 
annual earnings and are working or looking for 
work. While many families meet these criteria, the 
federal CDCC is nonrefundable, so only families 
with positive tax liability afer other deductions can 
beneft. Nonetheless, several states ofer their own 
refundable CDCCs that can mitigate child care 
costs for lower-income families. 
In 2003, the Economic Growth and Tax 
Reconciliation Act expanded the CDCC and led 
to large increases in both state and federal CDCC 
expenditures. To understand who benefted 
from the CDCC before and afer its expansion, I 
document CDCC eligibility and expenditures over 
time and across income and demographic groups. 
I fnd that around the time of the expansion, 
about 20 percent of households qualifed for 
CDCC benefts and that the majority of federal 
expenditures were allocated toward low- and 
middle-income taxpayers. I then estimate the 
efects of beneft increases on paid child care 
participation and parent employment outcomes. 
I fnd that among households with eligible 
dependents, a 20 percent increase in CDCC 
benefts—an additional $150 on average for those 
receiving benefts at baseline, which is around the 
typical increase within that group—raises annual 
paid child care participation by 2 percentage 
points, or about 10 percent. I also fnd that CDCC 
benefts increase work and earnings among 
If the federal CDCC were made
refundable, an additional 4 percent
of single mothers, 2 percent of
single fathers, and 2 percent
of married households would
qualify for benefts. 
married mothers. In particular, evidence suggests 
that CDCC benefts help married mothers remain 
in the labor force around childbirth, which may 
subsequently lead to increases in their lifetime 
earnings. 
How Does the CDCC Work? 
Congress implemented the federal CDCC in 
1976 and expanded it in 1981. To receive CDCC 
benefts, working households with children 
younger than 13 years old claim child care 
expenses on their tax forms and receive tax credits 
worth a fraction of those expenses that depends 
on their income. For two-parent households, if 
either parent’s earnings are less than child care 
expenditures, then the CDCC is based of of the 
lesser-earning parent. Eligible child care spending 
includes care provided by anyone outside the 
household, excepting a noncustodial parent. In 
claiming the credit, households must list their 
earnings, child care expenses, and child care 
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providers’ tax identifcation or Social fraction falls, reaching only 20 percent, 
Security numbers on federal income tax or $600, for those with $43,000 or more 
Form 2441. Benefts decrease taxes due in AGI. 
at tax fling time the following year. 
Te value of the CDCC, however, Who Benefts from the CDCC? 
was not indexed to infation, and its real 
value decreased substantially over time In practice, the nonrefundability of 
until the Economic Growth and Tax the federal CDCC—the credit cannot 
Reconciliation Act expanded the federal exceed taxable income—generates a 
diference between statutory benefts 
and those that low-income households Because benefts are tied to work,
actually receive. Very-low-income 
increases in CDCC generosity households have little, if any, tax 
liability afer other deductions. In should increase employment, as
Figure 1, I use tax fling thresholds— 
larger beneft amounts drive AGI levels at which households begin 
to have positive tax liability—to show parents to enter the labor force. 
that, consequently, households with 
children must have incomes of between 
credit in 2003. Beginning that year, $13,000 and $16,000 to be eligible for 
households could claim up to $3,000 federal CDCC benefts, both before and 
of child care expenditures per child for afer the federal expansion. 
up to two children. Such households Before the reform, efective CDCC 
technically could receive benefts worth benefts for households with one 
up to 35 percent of those expenses, or eligible child peak at just over $600, 
$1,050 per child, if their adjusted gross when AGI reaches approximately 
income (AGI) did not exceed $15,000. $19,000; benefts then fall to about $480 
As income rises, however, the credit for households with $30,000 or more 







NOTE: The fgure shows expected federal CDCC benefts for households with one (blue line), or two or more (red line), 
eligible children, as a function of adjusted gross income (AGI) before and after the federal CDCC expansion in 2003. 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations from federal tax forms. 
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in income. Afer the federal expansion, 
benefts instead peak at about $940 for 
households with $22,500 in income, 
and then fall to $600 for households 
with $43,000 or more in income. 
Households with two or more eligible 
children receive more generous credits 
but otherwise face similar increases and 
decreases with income. 
Using data from the March Current 
Population Survey (CPS), which has 
demographic and income data for U.S. 
families, and the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation, which 
has child care expenditure data, I fnd 
that 21 percent of single mothers, 
22 percent of single fathers, and 21 
percent of married-parent households 
qualifed for CDCC benefts, afer 
accounting for nonrefundability, right 
before the reform. (In the absence of 
other changes, an additional 4 percent 
of single mothers, 2 percent of single 
fathers, and 2 percent of married 
households would have qualifed for 
benefts if the federal CDCC were 
refundable.) 
Te lef panel of Figure 2 shows 
that the likelihood of CDCC eligibility 
generally rises with income, as high-
income households are more likely 
both to pay for child care services and 
to have positive tax liability afer other 
deductions. Less than 4 percent of 
households with AGI under $15,000 are 
eligible for CDCC benefts, both before 
and afer the federal CDCC expansion. 
Conversely, nearly 30 percent of 
households with AGI between $100,000 
and $200,000 are eligible for the CDCC. 
Te right panel of Figure 2 uses data 
from the Internal Revenue Service to 
show that low- and middle-income 
households received the majority of 
federal CDCC benefts in the early 
2000s; households with federal AGI 
between $25,000 and $50,000 received 
over 30 percent of benefts both before 
and afer the federal expansion. Very-
low- and very-high-income households 
combined received less than 4 percent 
of benefts. 
In addition, households in about 
half of states in 2002 could receive 
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additional CDCC benefts through state 
supplements to the federal credit. Tese 
state benefts are either a share of the 
household’s federal benefts or based on 
the child care expenses used to calculate 
them, and some are refundable. Because 
of these linkages, the 2003 federal 
CDCC expansion increased benefts 
diferentially across states, as well as 
across family sizes. 
Impacts on Paid Child Care 
Participation and Employment
Outcomes 
Because the CDCC decreases child 
care costs, increases in its generosity 
should increase child care spending. 
Because the benefts are tied to work, 
generosity increases should also 
increase employment, as larger beneft 
amounts drive parents to enter the 
labor force. Estimating these causal 
relationships can be tricky, however, 
especially if households change their 
behavior in response to changes in 
the CDCC. For example, increases 
in CDCC generosity may cause 
households to start paying for child 
care services and thus newly qualify for 
benefts. Hence, it becomes a challenge 
to estimate efects because benefts 
change simultaneously with paid child 
qualify for the nonrefundable federal 
credit and are more likely to work 
before the federal expansion, I do not 
fnd statistically signifcant impacts 
on employment or earnings. Among 
married women, however, a 20 percent 
increase in CDCC benefts leads, on 
average, to a 1 percent increase in 
annual employment, a 1.6 percent 
increase in hours worked per week, 
and a 10 percent increase in annual 
earnings, although these average 
responses likely refect little change for 
some mothers and even larger increases 
for others. Still, these efects suggest 
that, at least to some extent, increases 
in work among married mothers help 
drive increases in paid child care use. 
Since child care is perhaps most 
critical to families with very young 
children, I also examine workforce 
outcomes among families with children 
younger than two. For these families, a 
20 percent increase in CDCC benefts 
increases maternal employment by 4 
percent, a much larger increase than 
for families with only older children. 
Tis implies that CDCC generosity may 
help mothers remain in the labor force 
around childbirth, which could increase 
their earnings in the long run. 
Policy Implications 
Upticks in the use of paid child care 
as beneft generosity increases indicate 
that the CDCC helps working parents 
pay for child care. Nevertheless, making 
Increases in the use of paid
child care indicate that the
CDCC helps working parents
pay for child care. 
the federal CDCC refundable would 
increase eligibility and benefts among 
the lowest-income working parents, 
who largely do not beneft from the 
current credit. In particular, likelihood 
of eligibility among single mothers 
Figure 2  CDCC Eligibility and Expenditures by Federal Adjusted Gross Income 
0.4 0.4 
2000-2002 2003-2005 
care participation and other outcomes. 
0.3 To overcome these issues, I create 
a “simulated” measure of CDCC 
generosity that is based on average 
benefts for household groups defned 
by year and state of residence, as well 
as household characteristics such as 































children, and educational attainment. 0.1 0.1 
Tese simulated averages capture the 
tax policy change but smooth over 
individual household decisions that 
could afect eligibility. 
Using data from the March CPS, 
I fnd that a 20 percent increase in 
CDCC benefts increases annual paid 
child care participation by about 2 
percentage points among households 
with children younger than 13. Among 
single mothers, who are less likely to 
0.0 0.0 
0-15 15-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 100-200 >200 0-15 15-25 25-50 50-75 75-100 100-200 >200 
Federal AGI ($000s) Federal AGI ($000s) 
NOTE: Left panel: Proportion of households with children presumed eligible for CDCC benefts, by adjusted gross 
income (AGI), in 2000–2002 and 2003–2005. Right panel: Proportion of federal CDCC benefts, by AGI of households, 
from 2000–2002 and 2003–2005. 
SOURCE: Left panel: Author’s calculations from March CPS and SIPP data. Right panel: Author’s calculations from IRS 
Statistics of Income data. 
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Tax Credits for Child Care Increase Take-
up and May Help More Mothers Work 
would increase by 19 percent if the Impacts of the COVID-19federal credit were made refundable. 
If low-income parents, who ofen 
have low work participation rates, Pandemic and the 
were to enter the labor force to 
receive benefts, refundability of the CARES Act on Earningscredit could even further expand 
eligibility. 
Moreover, substantial earnings and Inequality
responses to increases in CDCC 
Guido Matias Cortes and Eliza C. Forsythegenerosity among married mothers, 
who tend to have incomes high Te COVID-19 pandemic has earners, leading to a dramatic increase 
enough to qualify for the existing had dramatic efects on the U.S. labor in labor income inequality. However,
(nonrefundable) credit, suggest market, with millions of workers we estimate that unemployment 
that expanding CDCC generosity losing their jobs, and millions more insurance benefts from traditional 
could have high returns even for experiencing changes in their working programs and the CARES Act 
those with higher incomes. Efects conditions. In this article we analyze exceeded total earnings losses by $9
of CDCC benefts on earnings may the labor income losses induced by the billion. Workers who were previously
be even larger amid the COVID-19 pandemic, with a focus on how impacts in the bottom third of the earnings
pandemic, which has led to school have varied throughout the earnings distribution received 49 percent of 
closures and increased child care distribution. We also assess the extent these benefts, reversing the increase in 
costs for many families. By tying to which the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, labor income inequality.
benefts to work, the CDCC may and Economic Security (CARES) Act
help keep parents in the workforce was able to mitigate these patterns. How Did the Pandemic Impact 
and reduce need for currently We show that the pandemic led to Labor Earnings?
overburdened safety net programs. a loss of aggregate real labor earnings 
of more than $250 billion between Using data from the Current
Reference March and July 2020. Tis decline was Population Survey (CPS), the ofcial 
entirely driven by job losses, which source of labor market statistics in theCare.com. 2018. “Tis Is How Much 
were substantially higher among low United States, and implementing aChild Care Costs in 2018.” https://www 
.care.com/c/stories/16221/cost-of-child 
-care-survey-2018-report/ (accessed July 
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regression approach in order to isolate Figure 2  Impact of the Pandemic on Probability of Remaining Employed, by 
the impact of the pandemic from Wage Percentile 
seasonal and annual patterns, we fnd 
that weekly labor earnings per adult 5% 
fell by nearly $100 between February 
and April, with only a partial recovery 0% 
thereafer. Tis essentially erased all 
of the increase in per capita earnings 
that had been experienced over the 
previous eight years. We estimate that 
this corresponds to $254 billion in lost 
aggregate earnings. 
Te CPS survey allows us to follow 
























to determine whether earnings losses 
were experienced by workers who 
remained employed, or whether they 
were solely driven by individuals who 
lost their jobs. Interestingly, we fnd 
that workers who remain employed 
did not experience any atypical labor 
earnings changes during the pandemic. 
Tis implies that the earnings losses 
associated with the pandemic are 
concentrated among individuals who 
lost their jobs—and hence all their 
labor incomes—while others who kept 
their jobs do not appear to have had 
their earnings afected. 
Importantly, these job losses were 
not evenly distributed throughout 
the earnings distribution. Job loss 
-25 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 
Wage percentile 
NOTE: The fgure plots the estimated coefcients and 95% confdence intervals for the impact of the 
pandemic on the probability of being employed throughout the earnings distribution, using individual-
level data on year-on-year changes from January 2015 to July 2020. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CPS data. 
Figure 3  Impact of the Pandemic on Labor Earnings (% change) 
20% 
10% 
probabilities were more than four 
times as large for individuals who were 
in the bottom decile of the earnings 
distribution before the pandemic, 
compared to individuals in the top 
decile. Tis means that the average 
worker from the bottom decile of the 
distribution lost nearly 40 percent of 
their earnings during the pandemic. 
Even within this low-earnings group, 
we fnd that those who were able to 
remain employed did not experience 
any atypical earnings changes; 






























concentrated among individuals who 
lost their complete labor incomes due 
to job loss. 
What Role Did Public Policy Play? 
Te fact that the pandemic had such 
devastating efects on the employment 
-80% 
10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 
Wage percentile 
NOTE: The fgure plots the estimated coefcients and 95% confdence intervals for the impact of the 
pandemic on the percent change in year-over-year real weekly labor earnings throughout the earnings 
distribution, using individual-level data on year-on-year changes from January 2015 to July 2020. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using CPS data. 
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outcomes of low earners is of great 
concern, given that these individuals 
were unlikely to be able to support 
themselves through savings afer 
experiencing job loss. Te role of 
public policy through the provision 
The pandemic led to a loss of
aggregate real labor earnings of
more than $250 billion between
March and July 2020. 
of unemployment benefts therefore 
proved crucial during the pandemic. 
In addition to standard unemployment 
insurance (UI) policies, the CARES 
Act, which was signed into law on 
March 27, 2020, expanded UI access 
to millions of Americans who are 
typically ineligible to receive benefts— 
including those with insufcient 
earnings to qualify and those who are 
self-employed—while also providing 
all UI benefciaries an additional $600 














Although the CPS data do not 
provide direct information on whether 
an individual is claiming UI, we can 
use individuals’ employment histories 
to infer their likely eligibility status. 
We also benchmark our estimates to 
Department of Labor data on the total 
number of paid claims in order to 
adjust our estimates for underclaiming 
and/or delays in payments. 
We fnd that although the expansion 
of UI benefts in the CARES Act 
was roughly intended to replace 100 
percent of workers’ predisplacement 
earnings, in practice it gave a majority 
of displaced workers more in benefts 
than they would have earned from 
work. Te additional amount of $600 
was chosen to replace 60 percent of 
the weekly earnings of the median 
worker—roughly $1,000. Tis 
supplementary payment would thus 
bring the total earnings replacement 
from standard UI (about $400) to 
100 percent of the worker’s previous 
earnings. However, because job losses 
were greater among lower-wage 
workers, the median weekly earnings 
of the displaced were only $519. Tis 
meant that the $600 replaced well 
over 60 percent of wages for most UI 
recipients; in fact, total UI benefts 
exceeded previous earnings for 80 
percent of displaced workers. 
Te combination of the inequality 
in job loss and the fat $600 beneft 
made the CARES Act an extremely 
progressive program. Without standard 
UI or the CARES Act provisions, 
workers initially in the bottom one-
third of the income distribution—as a 
whole, regardless of whether they lost 
their jobs—would have experienced 
an average decline in their weekly 
earnings growth rate of more than 15 
percentage points. Instead, the greater 
benefts increased earnings growth 
for these individuals by 20 percentage 
points or more. Tis is illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
Although this estimated 
percentage point increase in earnings 
growth is large, because of the low 
predisplacement earnings of this group, 
it translates into an average increase 
of less than $100 per week. Previous 
research has also found that low-
income individuals and those who had 
lost work were the groups most likely 
to spend their $1,200 stimulus checks 
(Baker et al. 2020), and the same likely 
applies to additional UI benefts. Tese 
additional CARES Act payments thus 
were very likely to have been spent 
and helped stimulate the economy. 
Overall, we calculate that total benefts 
paid exceeded total lost wage earnings 
by around $9 billion, with workers in 
the bottom one-third of the earnings 
distribution receiving 49 percent of 
total UI payments (standard plus 
CARES Act enhancements). Terefore, 
the program was efective at targeting 
transfers to individuals who needed 
it most, while also providing extra 
stimulus to the economy. 
While the expanded UI benefts 
under the CARES Act were successful 
in replacing income and increasing 
consumption for recipients, we 
nonetheless estimate that around 
Figure 4  Changes in Combined Earnings and Unemployment Insurance Payments during 
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NOTE: The fgure plots the estimated coefcients and 95% confdence intervals for the impact of the 
pandemic on the percent change in the total of earnings and estimated UI payments throughout the 
earnings distribution, using individual-level data on year-on-year percentage changes from January 
2015 to July 2020. 
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5 percent of individuals eligible to 
receive benefts did not actually receive 
them. Furthermore, about 30 percent 
of individuals who lost employment 
during the pandemic do not meet our 
screen for UI eligibility—generally 
because they did not report sufcient 
predisplacement earnings. Tese 
workers are much more likely to be 
low-earning, and hence most in need 
for stimulus payments. 
Policy Implications 
Te enhanced unemployment 
benefts authorized by the CARES 
Act ended on July 31, even though 
employment remains far below its 
prepandemic level. Workers who 
remain unemployed have experienced 
a signifcant reduction in benefts. 
Given that these individuals 
disproportionately worked in low-
paying jobs before the onset of the 
pandemic, few are likely to have access 
to savings or other sources of income 
to weather a period of sustained lower 
earnings. Although there have been 
concerns that the enhanced benefts 
provided by the CARES Act may have 
discouraged recipients from seeking 
work, so far there has been little 
evidence (see Bartik et al. [2020] and 
Dube [2020]). Reinstating enhanced 
benefts along the lines of those 
provided by the CARES Act would 
not only be benefcial in terms of 
mitigating the asymmetric efects of the 
pandemic and the associated increase 
in inequality and potential impacts on 
poverty, it would also add stimulus that 
would promote aggregate demand and 
help speed the recovery. 
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